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This thesis is an analysis of the Materiel Fielding Plan
(MFP) for the Army's Single Channel Ground and Airborne
Radio System (SINCGARS). Objectives of the study are to
identify major potential problem areas in the Materiel
Fielding Plan, and to generate recommendations for resolving
these problems. The study involves a specific analysis of
the maintenance and supply support aspects of the MFP within
the context of the Major System acquisition framework.
Research included extensive field interviews with personnel
in the functional management areas of the Communications and
Electronics Command (CECOM) , the Project Office, and the
Department of Army Staff. Potential problems identified
concern the redistribution of VRC-12 series and PRC-77
radios, the imbedded COMSEC modification, and the issue of
warranties. Recommendations include purchasing a warranty
for the original production contract, improving the planning
for redistribution of old radios, and providing strict
control over the design of the imbedded COMSEC modification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOCUS OF THIS STUDY
Annual appropriations for United States Army Procurement
will continue to exceed $19 billion during the period
1985-1990, with the bulk of these funds being spent on
projects designated as "Major Weapon Systems." The Single
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is one
of 40 Army Major Weapon Systems, and is designed to replace
the Very High Frequency (VHF), combat net radio now in use.
This is the most significant step taken to improve the
combat communications capabilities of the Army in 30 years.
More than $10 billion (FY 83) will be spent to acquire,
field, and operate over 277,000 radios in virtually every
unit throughout the Army, as well as the other three
services [Ref. 1: p. D3 and 2: p. 718],
The initial production contract, with the
Aerospace/Optical Division of International Telephone and
Telegraph (ITT) was signed on 2 December 1983, for the first
650 units. It included options to buy a total of 43,950
additional radios during program years two, three, and four.
The acquisition strategy calls for ITT to qualify a second
source by 1985, and to raise production to a rate of 16,000
per year by 1987.
Radios from the first production lot will be fielded in
February 1986 [Ref. 3: p. DA-1]. Preliminary planning for
the fielding effort is complete, and is contained in the
Materiel Fielding Plan (MFP), which was released by the
SINCGARS Project Manager in February 1984.
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B. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this research is to examine the Materiel
Fielding Plan (MFP) for the SINCGARS Ground System. The
objectives are to learn how the Materiel Fielding Plan
works, and to identify major potential problem areas.
Furthermore, the study will attempt to identify and analyze
any possible problems involved in the MFP, and to generate
recommendations for resolving them.
The intent is to look at the SINCGARS fielding effort
from a new perspective. A particular emphasis will be
placed on researching potential unknowns in terms of
additional resource requirements.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Consistent with these objectives, the research focuses
on the following questions:
1 . Primary Research Question
What are the major potential problems in the System
Support Area of the Materiel Fielding Plan for the SINCGARS
ground radio system and how might these problems be
addressed?
2 . Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What are the principal characteristics of the
Materiel Fielding Plan for the SINCGARS Ground Radio System?
b. What is the maintenance concept for SINCGARS,
and how can it be implemented?
c. What are the warranty/guaranty features and how
will these be enforced?
d. What are the key aspects of supply support for
SINCGARS, and what are the implications in terms of spare
parts acquisition?
11
e. What resource requirements have yet to be
identified?
f. How might the problems identified in the mainte-
nance and supply support planning be addressed and resolved?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The first phase of research involved a comprehensive
review of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policy
concerning major system acquisition. Sources of information
included Congressional Reports, Government Accounting Office
reports, instructions, regulations at all levels, and
periodicals dealing with the acquisition process.
The second phase of the research involved an analysis of
the SINCGARS project with respect to the DoD acquisition
framework. The major potential problem areas were identi-
fied during extensive field interviews with personnel in the
functional management areas of the Communications and
Electronics Command (CECOM) , the Project Office, and the
Department of Army Staff. These problem areas were analyzed
with respect to the existing policy and guidance for weapon
system acquisition.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of the study has been restricted to the main-
tenance and supply support aspects of the Materiel Fielding
Plan (MFP). Training and documentation issues have not been
addressed at this time. While there are important questions
remaining regarding the doctrinal employment of the radios
,
this research will not attempt to treat these issues in
detail. However, it will be shown that doctrinal decisions
have significant impact on the Materiel Fielding Plan.
During the Army System Acquisition Review Council
(ASARC) of September 1983, direction was given to restart
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development of a single band version of Airborne SINCGARS in
order to minimize the "time gap" between the ground and
aircraft radio availability. [Ref. 1: p. 3]. This study-
has not specifically addressed the Materiel Fielding Plan
for the Airborne version, although some of the related
issues will be discussed in Chapters IV and V.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
The study assumes that the reader has a basic under-
standing of the Federal Government acquisition process.
Additionally, it is assumed that the reader has a basic
understanding of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and its
structure with regard to the acquisition process.
G. DEFINITIONS
Materiel Fielding - The management function which
focuses on the "nandoff" of a fully developed item/
system from the Materiel Developer to the User.
Integrated Logistics Support Plan - Provides a composite
of all support considerations necessary to assure the
effective and economical support of a system for its
life cycle, and serves as the source document for
summary and consolidated information required in other
documents of the program management documentation.
Life Cycle Cost - The total cost to the Government for
the development, acquisition, operation, support, and
disposal or an item/system over a defined life span.
Maintenance Concept - Constitutes a series of statements
and/or illustrations defining criteria covering mainte-
nance levels, major functions accomplished at each level
of maintenance, basic support policies, effectiveness
factors, and primary logistic support requirements.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study begins in Chapter II with a summarization of
the framework and background in which the Materiel Fielding
Plan has been developed. An understanding of the overall
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Department of Defense policy and guidance for developing and
procuring major weapon systems is necessary. From this
base, it is possible to examine how the SINCGARS logistics
considerations were incorporated in the SINCGARS design, and
in turn, how these considerations impact the fielding of the
SINCGARS system.
Chapter II also includes a section on background infor-
mation which provides an historical perspective on the
SINCGARS project. A chronology of key events and a descrip-
tion of program evolution sets the stage for specific
analysis of maintenance and supply support considerations.
A descriptive summary of the Materiel Fielding Plan is
provided in Chapter III. This chapter delineates the prin-
cipal characteristics of the Materiel Fielding Plan,
focusing on maintenance and supply support considerations.
An examination of the Materiel Fielding Plan suggests many
issues which are then examined in detail in Chapters IV and
V.
Chapter IV examines the development of the maintenance
concept in the context of the Department of Defense acquisi-
tion framework discussed in Chapter II. The analysis also
determines how well the Materiel Fielding Plan evolved from
the maintenance concept. Problem areas are then examined in
detail
.
Because supply support aspects of the SINCGARS Materiel
Fielding Plan are strongly related to the maintenance
concept, Chapter V examines a number of potential supply
support issues with respect to their impact on the fielding
effort. Again, the analysis is focused on how the SINCGARS
fielding plan fits into the context of the Department of
Defense acquisition framework.
In Chapter VI, the potential major problems which have
been identified are recapped and possible alternative
courses of action are discussed. The final chapter then
14
presents conclusions and recommended actions for resolution
of problem areas identified.
15
II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the United States Army has begun
an aggressive force modernization campaign. Numerous new
weapon systems have been fielded, and many more are on the
way. During the Viet Nam War, the Army came to realize that
the fielding process is a critical step in the acquisition
process [Ref. 4: pp. 20-58]. Through painful mistakes, the
Army found that the process of handing- off a new weapon
system from the materiel developer to the user can be very
complex and expensive if not properly managed. Problems
which surface during fielding often require enormous
resources to rectify.
The Materiel Fielding Plan (MFP) is a concept peculiar
to the Army. Other services view the fielding process as a
subset of the Integrated Logistics Support Plan. This
chapter will examine the MFP in the broader context of the
acquisition process, and will provide a descriptive account
of the SINCGARS program background. The stage will then be
set for an analysis of the SINCGARS Materiel Fielding Plan






The Department of Defense policy for acquisition of
major weapon systems is grounded in 0MB Circular A- 109
[Ref. 5]. The guidance for implementation is specified in
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 and Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.2. The Department of Defense
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endeavors to achieve a number of specific objectives through
these documents, as well as several others issued at DoD and
Army level. Often these objectives are in conflict and
trade-offs must be made. It is useful to summarize the
principles and objectives which are discussed in DoD
Directive 5000.1 as follows:
1. Effective design and price competition will be used
to ensure cost-effective systems which are responsive to
mission needs
.
2. Improved readiness and sus tainability are primary
objectives. Operational suitability is of equal
importance as operational effectiveness.
3. Stability is necessary for effective, efficient and
timely acquisitions. It will be achieved through effec-
tive long range planning. Plans will consider economic
rates of production, surge capacity, logistics support,
and manpower requirements. Evolutionary alternatives
will be considered instead of solutions at the frontiers
of technology. An acquisition strategy will be devel-
oped at the inception of each major acquisition that
sets forth the objectives, resources, management assump-
tions, extent of competition, proposed contract types,
and program structure. The acquisition plan will tailor
the prescribed steps in the major system acquisition
decision-making process to this strategy.
4. Efficiency in the acquisition process will be
achieved through delegation of authority and
responsibility.
5. A cost-effective balance must be achieved between
acquisition costs, ownership costs, and system
effectiveness
.
6. Standardization and interoperability between the U.S.
and its allies, and between services will be maximized.
7. A strong industrial base is a key objective.
[Ref. 6: p. 2-3]
It is recognized that many of these objectives compete with
each other in a practical sense. Therefore, tradeoffs are
acceptable and necessary. Nonetheless, the objectives
represent important goals in the Government acquisition





2. Demonstration and Validation
3. Full-Scale Development
4. Production and Deployment
The acquisition process is such that the transition
from one phase to the next is marked by a Milestone, or
decision point. At each of these Milestones, an affirmative
decision to proceed must be reached by the Secretary of
Defense. His decision is based on a review by the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) which is chaired
by the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USDRE) who fills the role of the Acquisition
Executive [Ref. 6: p. 5].
Following Concept Exploration, and the decision to
move forward into Demonstration and Validation, the
Secretary of the Army will normally appoint a Project
Manager (PM) to manage all aspects of the acquisition
process [Ref. 7: p. 1.19]. The Project Manager becomes the
focal point for all of the planning and coordination
involved in the new system. The PM maintains a staff of
functional area experts and he draws on assets throughout
the particular commodity command in a matrix management- type
of an organization. Each project office is tailored to meet
the needs of the specific project and changes with the
acquisition process.
The responsibilities and authority of the Project
Manager are extensive. Perhaps the most obvious responsi-
bility of the PM is to fill the role of the system's advo-
cate or proponent [Ref. 7: p. 1.19]. He becomes the
motivating force which ensures progress through the phases
of the acquisition process. Balanced against the PM's
responsibility as advocate is his responsibility to ensure
the fielding of a quality product using the limited
18
resources provided. His responsibilities with regard to
Life Cycle Costs (LCC) are particularly important because of
the increasing concern over the size of the Defense budget
and, more specifically, the sensitive subject of "cost over-
runs" and af fordability . Early in the acquisition process,
the PM must develop an Acquisition Strategy which adequately
considers affordability as a function of cost, priority, and
availability of fiscal and manpower resources [Ref. 6: p.
6] . The acquisition strategy must reflect the principles
and objectives of DoD Directive 5000.1 and it must be flex-
ible enough to handle changes in technology, mission needs,
and funding [Ref. 6: p. 7].
2 . Materiel Fielding Plan
The Army has enhanced its ability to accurately plan
for the actual fielding of weapon systems by instituting a
requirement for a Materiel Fielding Plan [Ref. 4: p. 22].
The MFP is the principal document around which coordination
and agreement on deployment of a new system are accomplished
to assure that the gaining command will have sufficient
advanced information to budget necessary resources and plan
for receipt of the equipment [Ref. 3: p. 10.8]. It forces
interaction between the user and the developer early in the
Full-Scale Development Phase. This interaction provides
valuable feedback to the PM which can have positive impact
on design and fielding decisions.
The materiel fielding plan is the total set of
actions and events required to manage and execute the
initial deployment of new systems and requires advance plan-
ning, negotiation, and agreement between the materiel
fielder and the gaining Major Command (MACOM) . The materiel
fielding process was established to achieve an orderly and
satisfactory materiel deployment leading to Initial
Operational Capability (IOC). The process starts with
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initial Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) planning at
program initiation. Beginning with early recognition of
fielding requirements, constraints, and resource impacts, it
evolves into detailed planning and coordination in the full
scale development phase.
The extensive force modernization effort now
underway within the Army has placed a managerial burden on
gaining MACOMs . Poor materiel fielding creates an adverse
impact by forcing the gaining MACOM to redirect previously
committed resources and personnel to support the moderniza-
tion item. In the eyes of the gaining MACOM, fielding
should not occur unless a total system is available. A
well-executed materiel fielding effort is a means of easing
this burden.
The term "total system" is intended to include the
following:
1. The primary end item including all major component
items
.
2. All separately authorized support equipment, test
measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE), and
tools
3. Maintenance and storage facilities.
4. Technical and supply manuals.
5. Repair parts, i.e.. Authorized Stockage
List/Prescribed Load List (ASL/PLL)
.
6. New Equipment Training (NET) and training aids.
7. Manpower and personnel.
8. Documentation (Table of Organization and Equipment
(TOE) and Modification Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTO&E)). [Ref. 9: p. 3]
In order to produce a comprehensive MFP which can
deal effectively with each of the "total system" areas above
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the fielding considerations must be well- integrated with
planning in all other functional areas of the project.
Critical to an effective fielding effort, is the concept
that materiel fielding is not a subsequent action, which is
performed as an afterthought [Ref. 10: p. 29].
3 . Testing
To measure how well a project is progressing, devel-
opmental and operational tests are conducted. Testing
according to a well designed Test and Evaluation Master Plan
(TEMP) is a crucial process [Ref. 7: p. 14-]. Fielding
considerations should be integrated into the TEMP and test
results should be closely monitored as they become available
to determine their impact on the fielding effort.
The new office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, was assigned responsibility in P.L. 98-84 for
approving operational test plans and for reporting to
Congress on the effectiveness and suitability for combat of
major defense acquisition programs before a final decision
is made to proceed beyond low rate initial production (LRIP)
[Ref. 11: p. 1] . The definition of LRIP for this purpose is
production of a system in limited quantity to be used in
operational test and evaluation for verification of
production engineering and design maturity and to estab-
lish a production base prior to a decision to proceed
with production.
A decision to enter production without entering LRIP is
equivalent to a decision to proceed beyond LRIP.
4 . In Summary
Warranty legislation, the requirement for a MFP , and
the requirement to obtain approval to proceed beyond LRIP,
represent recent initiatives designed to insure that the
user gets a quality product. Each initiative is
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interrelated with the others, and with the overall acquisi-
tion process, but the important concept to grasp is that
each initiative requires comprehensive planning and fore-
casting of future events. It is in the Materiel Fielding
Plan that the PM actually attempts to envision what will
happen when he places his system in the hands of the user.
In this respect, the MFP represents the climax of the
acquisition process.
C . BACKGROUND
The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS) will be the VHF/FM radio communications system
providing the primary means of command and control for
Infantry, Artillery, and Armor units. It will serve as the
principal means of communication in the echelons of the
Division between the Brigade and Division Artillery down to
platoons and, therefore, is critical to the successful
conduct of land battle. SINCGARS will also provide the
command and control means to Combat Support and Combat
Service Support units of the Army in the field. The
SINCGARS family of radios will be capable of transmitting
voice, tactical data and record traffic.
SINCGARS replaces the current standard vehicular and
manpack radio configurations; the AN/VRC-12 family and the
AN/PRC-77. Development of an airborne SINCGARS was initi-
ated in 1978 to replace the AN/ARC- 114. This development
was deferred in 1981 because of a program funding shortfall
and was later terminated in 1982 in favor of acquiring a
VHF-AM/FM SINCGARS compatible radio for installation in
Army/Air Force aircraft. The airborne version was recently
restarted by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army during the
Milestone Decision Review III, on 21 September 1983.
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The Required Operational Capability (ROC) document was
approved by the Department of the Army in December 1974.
(See Figure 2.1) A joint ROC was later approved in 1976. At
DSARC I, in February 1976, the SINCGARS program was
approved. A development contract to explore Fast Frequency
Hopping (FFH) techniques was awarded, as well as two
contracts to explore Slow Frequency Hopping (SFH) tech-
niques. Frequency Hopping is a process by which all of the
radios in a communications net simultaneously "hop" over a
number of preset frequencies. The "hopping" is synchronized
among all net members to provide required communications.
The maturity Developmental/Operational tests were
conducted and completed during the July-December 1983 time-
frame. At that time, it was apparent, at least to the
communications audience, that the frequency hopping concept
as employed by ITT could accomplish the mission. All of the
early developmental testing indicated that the design would
be highly successful in avoiding the jamming threat [Ref. 1:
p. 11].
The initial production contract for SINCGARS had been
envisioned as a four-year multiyear procurement.
Congressional notification was required because of the
amount of the cancellation ceiling, and this was accom-
plished in May 1983 [Ref. 1: p. 3]. Although approval was
obtained from three of four congressional committees, the
House Appropriations Committee (HAC) non-concurred in
November 1983 [Ref. 1: p. 3]. Therefore, a single year
contract was awarded on 2 December 1983 for 650 units with
follow-on options for a total buy of 28,100 units. However,
the contract contained a clause allowing the Army to convert
to a multiyear contract prior to 31 May 1984 if approved by
Congress. A request for reconsideration was forwarded to
the HAC in early January 1984, but was denied in June 1984.
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Dec 1974 SINCGARS Required Operational Capability
approved
Oct 1975 ASARC I
Feb 1976 DSARC I
Jun 1977 VCSA directs program acceleration
Jan 1981 Funding limitation slows development
Aug 1981 Development deferred on aircraft version,
COMSEC module, data adapter, secureable
remote control unit
Dec 1981 VCSA directed further acceleration
May 1982 USDRE delegated management service
authority to the Army
Jul 1983 Maturity Operational Test
Sept 1983 ASARC III - VCSA directs airborne fielding
concurrent with ground system
- Production decision and Source
Selection ratified
Dec 1983 Initial production contract awarded
Feb 1984 MFP released
Sept 1984 Operational Assessment Tests
Oct 1984 DSARC approves 1st year option
Source: Deve loped by researcher
Figure 2.1 SINCGARS Chronology
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It is important to recognize that the decision not to
pursue a multiyear approach was a significant change to the
acquisition strategy for SINCGARS . The original plan to go
multiyear was undoubtedly "built in" to much of the planning
for SINCGARS during that period. The effect of this
built-in bias is discussed in Chapter IV, particularly with
respect to warranties.
A critical decision in the project was made in June
1977. At that time the Vice Chief of Staff directed that
the SINCGARS project be accelerated by two to three years
[Ref. 1: p. 2]. The resulting concurrency has had some
significant impact on supply support which will be discussed
in Chapter V.
The 1984 directive by the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation concerning LRIP , was issued subsequent to the
initial production award of 650 units. It was determined
that SINCGARS did not fall under the purview of this direc-
tive because it had already passed the LRIP stage [Ref. 12].
On 19 June 1984 the operational test plan for SINCGARS was
approved by DOT&E [Ref. 13]. The test schedule for SINCGARS
TABLE I
Testing Schedule
Maturity (Operational) Testing Apr 83 - Dec 83
Operational Assessment Testing Aug 84 - Dec 84
1st Article Production Test May 85 - Aug 85
Small Scale Force Development Test Oct 85 - Mar 86
and Evaluation (FDTE)
IOC Unit Testing (Ft. Hood) Jan 87 - Sep 88
is presented in Table I [Ref. 14: p. 29].
25
There is one significant problem with the Operational
Test Plan. There will not be sufficient quantities of
radios to test a division-size unit until 1987. This is
more than a year after the first radios will be fielded.
Although there have been some extensive computer simula-
tions, it is impossible to perform an actual test of several
hundred radios, operating in dozens of nets, until
sufficient radios have been produced [Ref. 1: p. E4]
.
During the maturity operational test (MOT) conducted in
1983, the Army's Operational Test and Evaluation Agency
(OTEA) identified specific deficiencies in the Advanced
Development Model (ADM) of the SINCGARS radio. The most
significant problems centered around the operation of the
radio because the man-machine interface was somewhat
complex. Additionally, there were some difficulties with
synchronization loss and loss of hopset variables.
Appropriate changes in design were made during the next 12
months and an operational assessment (0/A) was conducted
from 22 August to 21 September 1984 at Ft. Huachuca,
Arizona. The results were satisfactory in each of the
problem areas identified during the MOT [Ref. 15: p. 9].
While the need for SINCGARS (at brigade and below) has not
changed, the Signal Corps in 1983 made a major shift in its
philosophy concerning tactical command and control communi-
cations above the brigade level. A new family of equipment
called the Mobile Subscriber Grid System (MSGS) was envi-
sioned [Ref. 17]. The MSGS system will include switchboards
linked by multichannel interconnects covering a geographical
area with a grid system, and several mobile telephones,
operating throughout the Corps area (See Figure 2.2)
[Ref. 18: p. 17]. It will replace virtually all of the
communications equipment presently employed in, around, and
between headquarters elements above the brigade. The intro-
duction of MSGS represents a major metamorphosis of the
26
Source: Pro-RITA Corporation
Figure 2.2 Mobile Subscriber Grid System
Signal Corps hardware. The shift to MSGS will require a
complete reorganization of all Division signal battalions,
and Corps signal brigades [Ref. 19: p. 5-1]. It is not
clear at this time, the extent to which MSGS equipment might
supercede the need for a limited number of SINCGARS
.
Since MSGS fielding is planned to occur almost simulta-
neously with the introduction of SINCGARS, the fielding
effort for SINCGARS must be considered within the broader
context of a rapidly changing Signal Corps. It must be
recognized that MSGS will compete for resources within the
Signal Corps, and within the Army at large. The Army has
committed itself to making two tremendous changes in
27
equipment at the same time; SINCGARS and MSGS. Because the
impact of fielding MSGS is likely to be much greater than
the impact of fielding SINCGARS, the need for a smooth
handoff of both systems becomes all the more crucial.
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III. THE MATERIEL FIELDING PLAN
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is a descriptive presentation of the
SINCGARS Materiel Fielding Plan (MFP). The intent is to
place the SINCGARS project in the perspective of the frame-
work and background of Chapter II, and to provide the reader
with a sense of how the fielding process is intended to
work.
B. THE MATERIEL FIELDING PLAN
The Materiel Fielding Plan for the SINCGARS Ground Radio
System was released in January 1983 and was revised on 29
February 1984 [Ref. 3]. It serves as the basis for the
Materiel Fielding Subplan and the Materiel Fielding
Agreement (MFA) . negotiated with each Major Command
(MACOM) . The MFA is a document negotiated between the PM
and each Major Command (MACOM)which enables the MACOM to
have early input to the fielding process. The Materiel
Fielding Plan describes the SINCGARS ground radio to be
fielded, how it will be fielded, and the support required
before, during, and after deployment. The plan represents a
synthesis of efforts from each of the functional areas
within the Army's Communications and Electronics Command.
Within the SINCGARS Project Management Office there is a
Materiel Division which has management responsibility for
all matters pertaining to the materiel fielding effort.
The general fielding scenario calls for the fielding of
the radios according to a priority listing of MACOMS . (See
Table II) The fielding effort for each MACOM will be a

























































































SINCGARS radios will be shipped from the contrac-
tor's plant to an Army depot for integration with associated
end items. Some ancillary equipment will be sent to the
depot, assembled with the major system equipment, and the
remaining equipment assembled and crated for shipment with
the radios under the total package fielding concept.
2. Pre-Handoff
Approximately 18 months prior to the handoff period,
the Materiel Fielding Team (MFT) Leader will visit the
gaining unit for a joint status review of handoff prepara-
tions and to coordinate actions required for the handoff
phase. Additional visits will be made at twelve, six, and
three months prior to handoff in order to insure continuous
and timely materiel updates.
3. Handoff
During the handoff period, deprocessing , system
checkout, materiel acceptance, and New Equipment Training
(NET) will be accomplished. The handoff period begins with
the arrival of the Materiel Fielding Team members and equip-
ment and ends with materiel acceptance by the gaining unit
commander
.
During the initial fielding period, the Project
Manager will provide the fielding teams with sufficient
repair parts and operational floats to insure delivery of
100-percent operational radio systems to the gaining units.
Initial provisioning of required Prescribed Load
Lists/Authorized Stockage Lists (PLL/ASL) for support of
unit and intermediate (Direct Support) maintenance will also
be furnished to the gaining units during the handoff period.
Repair/replacement of defective radio systems identified
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during handoff, and prior to the gaining unit acceptance,
will be accomplished by the Materiel Fielding Team with
fielding team assets. Gaining unit acceptance will be on a
radio installation basis and, once accepted, the gaining
unit assumes total responsibility for maintenance of that
radio installation.
Gaining units are responsible to insure that all
required Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE),
as described in the Materiel Fielding Plan, is available at
designated maintenance facilities prior to the beginning of
handoff [Ref. 3: p. 3]. Gaining units are also responsible
for the requisitioning of the memory hold batteries and the
manpack batteries. Batteries will not be provided by the
Materiel Fielding Team.
C. MATERIEL FIELDING AGREEMENT
As stated above, the MFP is the basis for the Materiel
Fielding Agreement (MFA) which is negotiated with each
MACOM. Specific responsibilities of both the MACOM and of
the Office of the Project Manager are delineated in the
agreement [Ref. 3: pp. 39, 46]. The Materiel Fielding
Agreement represents an extremely important document in the
whole acquisition process. Both parties commit themselves
in the agreement to actions which represent the culmination
of the entire program. The agreement specifically requires
the MFT to install SINCGARS systems in every vehicle, and to
conduct initialization and system checkout tests. Once this
process begins, it is too late to discover that the gaining
unit has had half of their M60 tanks replaced by Ml tanks.
This would slow the fielding process, because the installa-
tion kit required for different vehicles are, not the same.
The earlier the MACOMs negotiate their Materiel Fielding
Agreements, the more likely it is that their concerns will
favorably affect design and fielding decisions.
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D. DOCTRINE
The responsibility for development of Doctrine on how to
deploy the SINCGARS radio rests with the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) [Ref. 7: p. 7.4]. Specifically,
the TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) is the focal point for this
effort. While training and doctrine are not the subjects of
this research effort, it is necessary to consider the
effects of doctrine on the materiel fielding plan and
logistical supportability
.
A potential problem area stems from the dual capability
of the SINCGARS radio to operate in either the frequency
hopping mode or the single channel mode. If operated in the
single channel mode, the SINCGARS radios can communicate
with the present VRC-12 series and PRC-77 radios. When the
SINCGARS radio is in the frequency hopping mode, communica-
tions with radios in the single channel mode is impossible.
Since the transition from the old FM radios to SINCGARS will
be occur over a period of years, it is clear that many situ-
ations will arise when Army units equipped with SINCGARS
radios will have to communicate with units without SINCGARS.
There is bound to be operational confusion whenever units
are forced to change their communications mode to accommo-
date an interoperability requirement. The distribution plan
for SINCGARS must therefore weigh operational considerations
very carefully.
The issue can be stretched to serious extremes when one
considers the hypothetical process of task organizing units
on a theater or even global scale. The major restructuring
associated with the Light Infantry Divisions and the New
Manning System cloud the issue further. Two additional
operational factors to consider are interoperability with
allies and other Services, and frequency management.
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Frequency management over a Theater Army area for
frequency hopping radios is a whole new field. It is
complicated by the fact that allied units will be operating
within the same area using discrete frequencies. The ques-
tions of who has what type of radios and when will they
transition has major implications in terms of support-
ability. A situation to be avoided is the case where a
single unit has both types of radios on hand and therefore
must keep spare parts for both radios.
The frequency management doctrine needed to effectively
assign sets of frequencies, known as "hopsets", to minimize
electromagnetic interference, and to maximize ECCM protec-
tion, has not been proven. This doctrine, embodied in a
computer program which determines non- interfering hopsets,
is currently being tested to the maximum extent possible
with so few radios. A complete test of this doctrine will
not occur until representative densities of radios are
fielded in FY 87.
E. INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for SINCGARS is
an ambiguous term because the radios will be fielded over a
period of several years (See Table 1). As already
mentioned, an orderly transition from old to new radios is
of utmost importance. On top of the need for a smooth
handoff, there is a pervasive pressure to "get SINCGARS
fielded." The radios presently in use throughout the Army
represent a 30 year-old technology which is highly suscep-
tible to enemy jamming capabilities. Professional communi-
cators are well aware of their vulnerabilities with the
present equipment, and they want the capabilities which
SINCGARS will bring [Ref. 16: p. 21].
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The acceleration of the project in June 1977, by the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, underscored the urgency for
a radio with electronic counter- countermeasures (ECCM) capa-
bility. In addition to the ECCM capabilities, a growing
need exists for radios with the capability to transmit data.
The 9th Infantry Division, at Ft. Lewis, Washington serves
as the Army's high technology "test bed", where numerous
state-of-the-art technologies are "tried" in an operational
environment. Because of the high density of equipment
requiring data transmission capabilities, the 9th Division
felt they could not wait for SINCGARS and procured a limited
number of frequency hopping radios , manufactured by the
Harris Corporation.
F. CURRENT STATUS
The decision to move SINCGARS into the production phase
of the acquisition process was made at DSARC III in
September 1983. However, as stated above, the production
contract was not a multiyear contract because neither the
production line nor the design had been stabilized. An
additional DSARC review was conducted on 29 October 1984 to
review design improvements made as a result of the maturity
operational test conducted in July 1983 and to decide
whether to exercise the first option. The results of the
operational assessment conducted in September 1984 were
positive, and consequently the October 1984 DSARC approved
the exercise of the first year option to acquire an
additional 3200 radios.
The Materiel Fielding Subplan for the Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was released on 18 June 1984.
Once the TRADOC schools have been issued SINCGARS, they will
be able to train operators who will subsequently be assigned
to field units throughout the Army prior to the arrival of
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the radios. On- the-ground coordination between the Materiel
Fielding Team (MFT) and the TRADOC schools has already begun
and the first deliveries will proceed as scheduled in
January 1986.
The introduction of the SINCGARS radio is an enormous
undertaking. The radio is absolutely critical to successful
command and control communications within the United States
Army, and therefore, the fielding effort must be successful.
The maintenance and supply support aspects of fielding
present some potential pitfalls which can only be prevented
through sound planning. Since fielding for SINCGARS is
still over one year off, it is an opportune time to




The operational deployment of the SINCGARS radio will be
in the forward battle area. It will be the principal means
of communications between units directly involved in ground
combat. This fact places obvious constraints on the mainte-
nance concept for SINCGARS, since the system must be capable
of highly reliable operations, with operational avail-
ability exceeding most Army equipment . Perhaps of
equal significance, is the requirement for a high degree of
maintainability
.
This Chapter will explore the SINCGARS Maintenance
Concept with respect to broader defense guidance, and will
identify some potential major problem areas which will will
then be discussed. Possible resolutions to problem areas
will be considered in Chapter VI.
B. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT
A comprehensive analysis of the SINCGARS maintenance
concept requires a preliminary discussion of major trends in
Army maintenance policies. Such a discussion flows
naturally from the trend toward a "high tech battlefield".
The sophistication of military weapon systems has grown
dramatically in recent years in conjunction with rapid
advances in the electronics and data processing fields.
Today's weapon systems reflect an ever- increasing level of
technological sophistication. The growth in use of inte-
grated circuit boards and micro-chip components has
magnified the challenge of testing and repairing military
hardware. In many cases, the skill level required to repair
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components has far outstripped the Army's ability to perform
extensive maintenance procedures with soldier labor [Ref. 4:
P- 50].
This maintainability challenge has had a profound impact
on the design process for weapon systems. Difficulty in
performing detailed maintenance tasks directly conflicts
with the Army's need to maintain a high state of operational
readiness [Ref. 20]. This conflict can be reduced by design
of weapon systems which are composed of Line Replaceable
Units (LRU's) and Printed Circuit Boards (PCB's) which
require minimal technical expertise to replace. Built in
Test Equipment (BITE) is a common feature used to isolate
faults to specific LRU's which can be easily replaced in
order to restore the system to an operational condition
[Ref. 8: p. 383]. These failed LRU's can then be trans-
ported back to some higher level maintenance organization
where they can be repaired and returned to service as
"floats" or shelf stock.
Alternative approaches for new systems range from
designing "throwaway" LRU's to designing complex LRUs which
require extensive technical expertise to repair. As the
number of LRU's increases, the supply pipeline must be
expanded to accommodate the increase [Ref. 20]. As the
complexity of LRU's increase, the training requirements for
maintenance personnel increase. Therefore, tradeoffs must
be made to design components which are either repairable, or
easily replaceable. If the design shifts toward replaceable
components, they must be designed so that the quantity of
inventory is manageable and affordable.
To a large extent, the maintainability parameters are
driven by operational requirements. Many field commanders
make forceful arguments that they cannot be bothered with
repair problems in the forward battle area when they are
engaged. in combat. At the same time, they cannot afford
to carry a mountain of repair parts. Clearly, a huge
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logistical tail is an undesirable characteristic.
Within CECOM, the decisions about what maintenance char-
acteristics to design into a system are made with the aid of
an Optimum Repair Level Analysis (ORLA) . Through the use of
an automated model called the Optimum Supply and Maintenance
(OSAM) Program, decisions are made concerning what level of
maintenance should repair or replace each LRU [Ref. 22].
C. LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
The criticality of the SINCGARS radio for successful
operations on the battlefield requires a highly streamlined
maintenance system capable of providing rapid repair and
return to the user [Ref. 16: p. 21]. The SINCGARS mainte-
nance approach is based upon the Army's evolving concept of
Unit, Intermediate (DS and GS), and Depot Maintenance
[Ref. 14: p. 30]. Maintenance tasks, responsibilities, and
actions to be taken at each echelon are as follows:
1 . Unit Maintenance
The unit operator requires no test equipment to
perform authorized maintenance at this level [Ref. 3: p.
22]. The maintenance functions are limited to cleaning, and
checking for cracks, frayed cables and loose hardware.
Using procedures in the operator's manual, the operator can
determine if the radio system is functioning within speci-
fied performance limits. Operators are authorized to change
the primary battery and the memory hold battery.
Unit maintenance will be performed by the Tactical
Communications Systems Operator/Mechanic, MOS 31V, utilizing
system built in test equipment, the AN/PRM-34 Test Set and
the AN/PSM-45 Multimeter. Unit Maintenance will consist of
fault isolation to LRUs. (ie., power amplifier, mounting
adapter, power system, COMSEC equipment, antenna, audio
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accessories, cables, mounting base) and removal and replace-
ment of the faulty LRU. The faulty LRU will be returned to
Intermediate
Direct Support level of
maintenance
.
2. Intermediate Direct Support (PS
)
The Field Radio Repairer, MOS 31E, will repair all
faulty LRU's. Utilizing common test equipment and a
SINCGARS Maintenance Kit (MK 2342/U) , 31E personnel will
fault isolate the LRU to the failed module (Shop replaceable
Unit-SRU) [Ref. 3: p. 24]. The faulty SRU will be removed
and evacuated to the Intermediate General Support evacuated
to Intermediate GS for repair. (See Figure 4.1) LRUs and
modules (SRUs) will be positioned at the Intermediate DS
depending on the density supported and demand.
3. Intermediate General Support (GS
)
Intermediate GS will perform the repair of SRUs
(containing one to three printed wiring assemblies) by
removal and replacement of faulty components and piece parts
[Ref. 3: p. 26]. Fault isolation of the modules and printed
wiring assemblies will be accomplished by the Electronic
Repairer, MOS 35C, utilizing the Automatic Test Station
AN/MSM-105 which includes the AN/USM-410 EQUATE and the
AN/USM-465A Digital Card Tester. Once fault diagnosis of
the Printed Wiring Assembly (s) has been accomplished, the
defective PWA is identified and tagged. The module
container with its defective PWA is sent to the Electronic
Repair Facility (part of the AN/MSM 105) where the defective
assemblies will be repaired by removal and replacement of
piece parts. Once repaired, the SRU is returned to the test
facility where it is again tested for Quality Assurance (QA)
prior to being returned to DX stock. Additionally,
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Figure 4.1 SINCGARS Maintenance Levels
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traditional "mechanical type" repair functions will be




Depot assignments for the SINCGARS are Tobyhanna
Army Depot (TOAD) as the primary and Sacramento Army Depot
(SAAD) as the secondary depot [Ref. 3: p. D2] . The depot
will be responsible for repair of SINCGARS modules/PWAs when
the required actions are beyond the capability of GS
elements and for those modules which are maintenance coded
for depot repair [Ref. 14: p. 33].
5 Contractor Maintenance
Contractor maintenance and supply support (GS level
and depot) is required to support the initial fielding.
This support will be required on a decreasing basis, for up
to two years after IOC [Ref. 14: p. 35]. Plans are being
established for GS and Depot Maintenance and supply from the
contractor's . facility at Ft. Wayne, Indiana during the
initial fielding to TRADOC schools. During this period,
unit and DS maintenance will be organic. The organic DS
maintenance will be performed by the Directorate of
Industrial Operations (DIO) at each school location.
Support to the FORSCOM units will be organic at the unit and
and DS level. GS and depot maintenance will be supplied by
the contractor until organic GS and depot support are fully
developed (FY88).
During the period of contractor support, procedures
will be developed that will allow tracking of all modules
returned for repair. This procedure mirrors the standard
flow of defective modules to a depot facility and will allow
early recording of failure data [Ref. 23].
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D. WARRANTIES
Chapter II mentioned the new warranty legislation, which
has had an interesting affect on SINCGARS . The initial
production contract for SINCGARS ground radios was signed
prior to the law taking affect. Consequently, the contract
did not require a warranty from ITT. Three years of options
were included in the contract, which means that no warranty
will be required for the SINCGARS ground version for the
first four years. However, the 29 October 1984 DSARC
directed that the introduction of the second source be
accelerated. The second source contract will be required to
include warranty provisions and therefore by 1989 there will
be two versions of SINCGARS ground radios in the field; one
with a warranty and one without [Ref. 24]. This prospect
has serious implications for the fielding effort.
Maintenance procedures at each level of maintenance are
currently being drafted. Since there is no warranty on the
current production contract, the maintenance guidance will
assign specific repair responsibilities to maintenance
personnel. Once the guidance is issued at the macro level
in the form of technical manuals, the maintenance shops at
all levels will devise standard operating procedures geared
toward implementing the guidance.
When radios are fielded which carry a warranty, they
cannot be handled in the same manner. An entirely new set
of maintenance procedures will have to be drafted which
prescribe what to do when a warranted radio enters the main-
tenance system. Under the warranty whole radios will have
to be evacuated and treated "specially."
The radio systems in combat units are reportable items
on unit readiness reports. Because of the adverse impact of
a "down" radio in terms of operational readiness, it seems
unlikely that field commanders will want to turn a radio in
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to the maintenance system without an immediate replacement.
Therefore, if a warranted radio is turned in to the mainte-
nance system, a whole radio will have to be "floated" in
order to keep the field unit combat ready. On the other
hand, a radio without a warranty can be repaired by the army
maintenance system. Faults will be isolated to an indi-
vidual LRU and only the LRU will be replaced. The float of
an LRU is quite different from the float of a whole radio.
Having two systems is clearly cumbersome and conflicts with
the guidance of DoD Directive 5000.1 as discussed in Chapter
II above. By placing an additional burden on the already
overburdened maintenance system, the dual warranty situation
will not contribute to readiness or sustainability
.
The contract for the airborne version of the radio is
currently being negotiated, and it therefore will fall under
the purview of the warranty legislation. The airborne
version and ground version will consist of at least 80 per
cent common parts [Ref. 23]. This should have obvious
benefits in terms of maintenance and supply, but it is not
at all clear what benefits will accrue to the Army.
It appears that the Army will not be able to take full
advantage of the commonality during the airborne warranty
period. Failed airborne radios will be returned to the
contractor, while failed ground radios which are not under
warranty will be repaired by soldiers.
E. AUTOMATED TEST/REPAIR FACILITIES
1. MSM/105 Automated Test/Repair Facility
The maintenance concept for the ground version of
SINCGARS, as summarized above, is built around a heavy
utilization of the MSM-105 automated test/repair facility.
The current data on workload seem to indicate that suffi-
cient MSM-105s will be fielded to accommodate all of the
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potential SINCGARS radios. The only potential problem in
this regard seems to be that the physical distribution of
the MSM-105s may not be ideally suited for the corresponding
distribution of SINCGARS. There are several cases where the
TRADOC training posts are not co-located with an interme-
diate rear (IR) maintenance facility (where an MSM-105 is
located). This problem will occur mainly at TRADOC schools,
such as the Armor School at Ft. Knox [Ref. 25].
Consequently, some detailed planning will be required to
delineate evacuation and direct exchange (DX) procedures for
each specific location. This situation is not peculiar to
SINCGARS, as several current and future weapon systems are
designed for repair in an MSM-105.
2. Intermediate Forward Test Facility
The Army has recently decided to field an automated
test facility at the Intermediate DS maintenance level. The
Intermediate Forward Test Equipment (IFTE) will replace
several smaller, specialized pieces of test equipment. IFTE
is being designed to support several Army major systems,
some of which are already fielded, and others soon to be
fielded [Ref. 20]
.
IFTE is scheduled to enter the full scale develop-
ment phase of the acquisition process in January 1985, with
the first unit to be fielded in March 1989 [Ref. 20]. It
seems clear that several IFTEs will be fielded either simul-
taneously, or shortly after SINCGARS fielding. It is not
clear what affect the introduction of IFTE will have on the
evolving maintenance concept for SINCGARS.
The MFP makes no mention of IFTE at all. Current
guidance for Direct Support Maintenance is based on utiliza-
tion of the DS test equipment specified in the MFP [Ref. 3:
p. 43]. If IFTE is fielded on schedule, the maintenance
procedures at the DS could be radically different. The DS
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maintenance facilities will be required to utilize test
program sets (TPSs) which have yet to be designed in
conjunction with IFTE, and there will be no need for the
ability to utilize the SINCGARS-peculiar test equipment,
which is specified in the MFP
.
F. IMBEDDED COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY EQUIPMENT
On 22 June 1984, Undersecretary of the Army Ambrose
directed that the Communications Security (COMSEC) equipment
for SINCGARS be imbedded into the frame of the radio as soon
as possible [Ref. 23]. COMSEC equipment under the initial
production contract is a separate LRU, independent of the
SINCGARS unit. This decision represents a major shift in
design which may require changes in the present maintenance
doctrine. Since the National Security Agency (NSA) has
overall authority over COMSEC equipment management, the
maintenance and supply systems for COMSEC are wholly inde-
pendent of the systems for all other Army equipment. The
NSA management authority includes acquisition, distribution,
maintenance and accountability for hardware and keying
material. Inoperative COMSEC equipment is evacuated through
a COMSEC maintenance system and is repaired by COMSEC
repairmen.
At the direct support level, the COMSEC maintenance
facility and the normal electronic maintenance shop are
physically located in different locations. For units in
Germany, the two maintenance facilities are often located on
completely different installations and may even be in
different cities. When a SINCGARS radio with imbedded
COMSEC is turned in to the DS maintenance shop as inopera-
tive, it is not clear what the procedure will be to trouble-
shoot and repair the system. A Radio Repairer (31E) does
not have the requisite training, much less the authority, to
perform maintenance on COMSEC equipment.
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The decision to combine the SINCGARS radio with its
associated COMSEC is intended to simplify the user's job.
The user's job may indeed be simplified if the integration
is well-executed. However, significant attention in this
area will be required to preclude problems.
The COMSEC integration will be performed in CY 89 as a
Preplanned Product Improvement (P I), as it is now planned.
Prior to that time, a number of significant issues must be
resolved. A determination must be made as to responsibility
and authority for maintenance of a radio with COMSEC compo-
nents inside. Otherwise, confusion over who may perform
maintenance on what parts of the radio may develop.
The effect of the COMSEC modification must be accounted
for in the Test Program Sets (TPSs) for both the MSM- 105
,
and the IFTE . The TPS for a COMSEC-equipped SINCGARS radio
will be different than the TPS for a radio without COMSEC.
Since a major portion (over 40,000) of radios will be
fielded prior to the COMSEC modification, it will be neces-
sary to maintain TPSs for radios with and without COMSEC.
Similarly, it will be necessary to maintain separate and
distinct repair procedures.
Because of the COMSEC modification there is a potential
for problems with respect to the distribution plan for
SINCGARS radios. If a single unit receives radios with
COMSEC imbedded in addition to radios without, the unit must
maintain the capability to repair both versions of the
radio. The maintenance capability must include spare parts,
training, and Test Program Sets. This duplication of main-
tenance effort is inherently counterproductive, and it
impedes the maintainability objectives expressed in DoD
Directive 5000.39 [Ref. 26].
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G . SUMMARY
The legislation to require warranties, and the decision
to imbed COMSEC will cause major revisions to the evolving
SINCGARS maintenance concept. Although these changes were
made subsequent to the initial planning for the project, the
PM must accommodate them as smoothly as possible. The PM
staff is well aware of the challenges in these areas and the
current planning is geared toward meeting the challenges.
48
V. SUPPLY SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The SINCGARS radio will be organic to nearly every unit
in the Army. Since none of the individual components of the
VRC-12 series or the PRC-77 radios are interchangeable with
SINCGARS, the introduction of SINCGARS radios will require a
complete transition of the repair parts. This includes the
installation kits for mounting the units, antennas, and
cables
.
This chapter will analyze the supply support planning
associated with the SINCGARS fielding effort and will
examine potential problem areas. Supply support for the
SINCGARS project is summarized in detail in the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan for SINCGARS Ground Radio Systems
,
released 15 March 1984 [Ref. 14].
B. THE SINCGARS RADIO
SINCGARS has been designed on a modular basis to achieve
maximum commonality among the various system configurations.
For example, a common receiver- transmitter (RT) is used in
the manpack and all vehicular configurations [Ref. 14: p.
3] . There are a total of ten components which make up the
various SINCGARS configurations. (See figure 5.1)
Since the SINCGARS radios will be phased-in over a
period of ten years, the transition of repair parts flow
will be an evolving process. As the demand for SINCGARS
parts increases, the VRC-12 and PRC-77 spare parts demand
should decrease. The recommended VRC-12' series radio
prescribed load list (PLL) stockage for a combat battalion




















Source: SINCGARS Integrated Logistic Support Plan
Figure 5.1 SINCGARS Configurations
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16] . This means that at least $3 million worth of spare
parts is stocked at the lowest inventory level on an
Army-wide basis at present. In view of the potentially high
total dollar value of the inventory for both types of
radios, sound planning can clearly preclude wasteful invest-




The reliability and maintainability characteristics of
SINCGARS are, of course, design parameters. The actual
values for components will undoubtedly vary somewhat from
the design figures. Even though the associated failure data
cannot be predicted very accurately, methodology exists for
deciding how many of each type of spare parts to include in
the original provisioning package. Within CECOM, two models
are used for automatically computing initial issue quanti-
ties (IIQ) based on assumed order-ship times, operating
level, and safety level quantities. The Selected
Essential-Item Stockage for Availability Method (SESAME)
model is used when no historical maintenance data is avail-
able, and the Automated Requirements Computation Initial
Provisioning (ARCIP) model is used when a sufficient degree
of data is built up.
Initial provisioning for SINCGARS will be accomplished
under the total package fielding concept [Ref. 3: p. 43].
Under this concept, all major end items, installation kits,
PLL and ASL, will be pre-staged at a depot prior to ship-
ment. They will be shipped during the hand-off phase and
will remain under control of the materiel fielding team
until accepted by the gaining command.
The provisioning for SINCGARS will be built up slowly.
Because of the high degree of contractor support initially,
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there is no need to procure a large number of spare parts.
As the failure data are accumulated by the contractor main-
tenance system, it will be possible to input these data into
the ARCIP model, and receive meaningful provisioning objec-
tives. This approach is consistent with DoD guidance. DoD
Directive 5000.39 states the following:
When determined necessary, interim contractor support
shall be planned to avoid compressing support delivery
schedules ... Transit ion to government support normally
shall be scheduled to occur after the system design is
stable, the capability to support the system has been
demonstrated, and the planned ILS resources for the
mature system can be delivered. [Ref. 26]
The system design is expected to become stable after the
production is well underway and after failure data have been
accumulated. As the production rate of the radios is
increased, spare parts provisioning will grow in turn.
D. DISPOSITION OF OLD RADIOS
The SINCGARS radios will replace the older VRC-12 family
and PRC-77 on a one-for-one basis. This means that over
171,000 "old" radios will be displaced. The current value
of the inventory of old radios on hand is nearly $ 600
million.- The prospect of turning-in, and redistributing
171,000 radios has some potentially serious hazards.
The current planning for the turn- in and redistribution
of old radios is in the early stages and will require much
further development. The guidance issued by DA calls for
redistribution according to the following priorities:
[Ref. 27]
If the current inventory of radio sets on hand is multi-
plied by the prices on the Army Master Data File (AMDF),
the value of all radio sets, less installation kits, is
over $550 million [Ref. 33]:
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1. Interchange requirements for force modernization
equipment
.
2. Redistribution within the MACOMs ' active components.
3. Redistribution within the MACOMs' reserve components.
4. Foreign Military Sales.
5. Grant aid.
At the present time, it is not clear how many (or when)
radios will be transferred to each of the these priorities.
Since disposal is not listed as one of the priorities, it is
assumed that a need exists for each old radio. This is a
critical assumption because it bears on how much effort
should be expended in planning for redistribution.
Since all of the radios will be redistributed somewhere,
it can also be assumed that all of them must be in a fully
operational condition. Sizeable funds may be needed to
place the old radios in transferable condition.
In order to transfer a piece of equipment from one hand-
receipt holder to another, it must meet "10/20 standards"
[Ref. 38]. This simply means that all maintenance require-
ments at the operator and direct support levels (10 and 20
level) must be fulfilled, and a radio system which merely
transmits and receives does not necessarily meet these
conditions. A recent maintenance "peak up" of radios in the
82nd Airborne Division provides some insight into the true
condition of present radios. The 82nd is considered by many
to be one of the most combat ready units in the Army, yet
the results of this inspection indicate serious deficiencies
in the operational condition of the equipment on hand.
The Logistics Assistance Team (LAT) assisted the 782nd
Maintenance Battalion personnel in testing 58 systems
installed in vehicles and 74 backpack systems from 28 July
to 1 August 1980. The vehicular configurations were 87%
Non-Operat ionally Ready (NOR) and the backpack systems were
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35 percent NOR [Ref. 28: p. 2]. To extrapolate the 82nd
experience into an Army-wide estimate would be inaccurate
for planning purposes. However, some similar data is avail-
able for units of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord,
California. During a 1982 program to upgrade the condition
of the division's radio systems, $82,541.50 was spent on
parts to repair installation kits alone [Ref. 29]. If this
figure were reflective of conditions throughout the Army,
the cost of bringing all installation kits up to 10/20
standards would be over $2 million.
Further evidence of an Army-wide problem concerning the
operational condition of VRC-12 series radios can be found
in a "Lessons Learned" report from the Commanding General of
the United States Army Signal Center and School, Ft. Gordon,
Georgia. The report refers to a January 1980 test of radios
in the Army's 1st Armored Division in Germany:
It also was found from the January 1980 test that there
was the gross lack of preventative maintenance by the
operators and crew members . It was evident from the
test results that the crew members of combat vehicles
were not properly installing or caring for their radio
systems. It was found that equipment is used until it
does not work any longer and then it is removed for
repair, either by the 31V10 or a repairer at direct
support. Numerous instances of broken or corroded
connectors, poor installation. and improper operation
were observed. [Ref. 37: p. 6]
When user units are approaching a handoff date for
SINCGARS , they may decide not to requisition sufficient
spare parts in time to bring their old radios up to speed.
If they order enough parts, they may exhaust the supply
system. Either way, they will be jeopardizing the SINCGARS
handoff date and since spare parts are stock funded, the
budgetary process may be unable to cope with the spurt in
requirements
.
An alternative to letting the system take its course
would be to turn in all radios to a depot and perform
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overhauls of selected radios. This is the type of procedure
which would be necessary if it were discovered that many of
the old radios were in sufficiently poor shape as to need a
total rebuild. There is some data available on this proce-
dure, as it has been performed for several years, and the
Materiel Management Directorate at CECOM budgets for a
limited number of depot rebuilds each year. The average
cost for a rebuild for the RT-524, which represents the
radio- telephone component of most VRC-12 configurations, is
over $1800 per radio [Ref. 34]. The cost for overhaul of
PRC-77 family radio- telephones is over $1000 per radio
[Ref. 34].
Finally, the redistribution of old radios is not a
"sexy" topic. It is easy to see why personnel involved in
the fielding for SINCGARS would not be interested in this
area. However, the impact of a poor transfer could be
tremendous . Field commanders cannot afford to be without
communications. If fielding SINCGARS to a unit becomes
contingent upon the unit successfully transferring their old
radios, the SINCGARS fielding could be held up. If units
attempt to transfer old radios which are not in 10/20 stan-
dards, and the new owners refuse to accept them, the
transfer process could come to a detrimental halt. In this
respect, the Project Manager for SINCGARS is effectively the
Project Manager for the redistribution of the VRC-12 series
and PRC-77 radios.
E. TEST EQUIPMENT AT DIRECT SUPPORT
In Chapter IV, we discussed the introduction of the
intermediate Forward Test Equipment (IFTE) as it applies to
maintenance considerations. The IFTE fielding may have some
significant supply support considerations, as well. The
maintenance concept for SINCGARS was conceived without
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consideration for IFTE [Ref. 14]. The MFP makes no refer-
ence to IFTE [Ref. 3]. However, it seems that the IFTE will
be fielded very close behind SINCGARS, and it will replace
all pf the DS- level TMDE specified in the SINCGARS MFP.
The SINCGARS MFP requires the following TMDE at the
Intermediate Forward (DS) level:
1. Oscilloscope AN/USM-488
2. Function Generator SG-1171/U
3. Counter TD-1225A(V)2
4. Digital Voltmeter AN/USM-486
5. Distortion Analyzer AN/URM-184A
6. Signal Generator SG- 1112 (V) 1/U
7. Maintenance Kit MK-2342/U
Each of these items of equipment are already on-hand in Army
units, except the oscilloscope and the digital voltmeter.
If IFTE is fielded on time, it is possible that some units
will never need these two pieces of SINCGARS-peculiar TMDE.
Approximately $150,000 in procurement money would be
required to equip every DS unit in the Army with both the
oscilloscope and the digital voltmeter.- The current plan-
ning calls for a procurement of sufficient quantities to
support fielding of SINCGARS up through Korea, at a cost of
approximately $60,000. If IFTE is fielded on time, there
will be no need to procure additional oscilloscopes and
voltmeters to support fielding to USAREUR and FORSCOM,
because they will never get to use the equipment. (See
figure 5.2) This means that $90,000 could be saved if IFTE
is fielded early enough to support SINCGARS.
The oscilloscopes cost $830/each and the digital voltme-
ters cost $408/each. There are 128 DS units which would
require them.
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Source: Developed by researcher
Figure 5.2 IFTE/ SINCGARS Fielding
F. OLD INSTALLATION KITS
There are presently more than 600 different types of
installation kits for the old VRC-12 series and PRC-77
radios. Installation kits are necessary to adapt the radio-
telephone equipment to over 40 different types of vehicles
in the Army inventory [Ref. 3: p. H2] . The basic components
of a typical installation kit include antennas, speakers,
cables, mounting bases, mounting hardware, handsets, and
other associated items required for operation. The instal-
lation kit used for the installation of a VRC-46 radio
system in a jeep is enclosed at Appendix B. A brief perusal
of the component listing reveals the fact that the kit
consists of large numbers of small expendable piece parts.
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The various SINCGARS configurations will require
completely new installation kits. The only thing common
between the two is the fact that the new kit will have the
same "footprint" and mounting holes as the MT-1029 mount
used with the VRC-12 family of radios [Ref. 14: p. 7].
As the old radios are transferred from one unit to
another, the requirement for an associated installation kit
will be transferred as well. A significant portion of the
"old" installation kits will not be re-usable. Most of the
hardware used to fasten the major parts to vehicles has been
subjected to years of rust, and several coats of paint.
Additionally, many pieces will be damaged during removal.
Virtually all of the components of installation kits hold an
expendable accountability classification code. Therefore,
there is little incentive for the present owners to worry
about how much of their old kits can be re-used.
There is currently a shortage of over 15,000 installa-
tion kits of the old type [Ref. 35]. When large quantities
of installation kits are laterally transferred, there will
be a corresponding surge in the demand for most of the
components of installation kits. There is a potential for
the supply and budgeting systems to be unable to accommodate
this surge.
This research effort has not uncovered any planning
effort within CECOM which addresses the possibility of
shortages of installation kits or components of installation
kits following redistribution. Given the fact that the
operational condition of installation kits is known to be
less that 10/20 standards (See Section B above), and given
the assumption that a need exists for all present




The redistribution of old radios and installation kits
looms as the greatest potential hazard to the SINCGARS
fielding effort. The responsibility to plan for the redis-
tribution cannot be ignored because a major problem in the
redistribution effort can have a direct impact on the
fielding effort for SINCGARS. Therefore, the fate of the
old radio system is very much a part of the SINCGARS project
and must be dealt with accordingly.
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VI. MATERIEL FIELDING : SOLUTIONS TO ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present potential courses of action
which may avert or alleviate problem areas identified in
Chapters IV and V. The solutions are structured within the
context of the framework discussed in Chapter II. Each
solution is intended to reduce the potential for large
resource requirements which might result from failure to
address the issues.
B. REDISTRIBUTION OF OLD RADIOS
The distribution requirement for VRC-12 series and
PRC-77 radios which will exist following the complete
fielding of SINCGARS must be crystalized. The redistribu-
tion guidance, as it currently stands, appears to imply that
a need exists for every VRC-12 series and every PRC-77
radio. If this indeed is the case, the specific require-
ments must be set down in detail in order to facilitate
planning
.
If there is a bona fide requirement for all of the old
radios, the question of how to best facilitate the transfers
must be broached. Either all of the radios should be turned
in to a depot for reconditioning or overhaul or a means of
ensuring a uniform quality standard should be devised for a
decentralized approach. The latter course of action seems
difficult at best. Based on the data discussed in Chapter
V, the magnitude of the problem may be quite large. Many
parts will be required and they will have to" come through a
demand- supported system which will be slow in responding to
a massive upgrade of the caliber necessary.
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The quality of the initially redistributed radios will
be inconsistent and poor, since it is likely that units will
offer up their lesser quality radios and keep their best.
Many radios will be redistributed within Major Commands
(MACOMs ) . Clearly, any redistribution of this nature is the
responsibility of the particular MACOM concerned. If for
instance, Forces Command (FORSCOM) units attempt to transfer
subquality radio systems to other FORSCOM units, the PM
SINCGARS can have little input to the transaction. It is
the FORSCOM Commander's responsibility to ensure that his
radios meet 10/20 standards.
For transfers between MACOMs the problem is more
complex. If the decision is made to make transfers without
a centralized turn-in, there must be some provisions made to
make this process flow smoothly. Field commanders must be
made aware of the fact that their equipment does not
currently meet 10/20 standards and they must be made aware
of what the minimum standards for transfer will be.
Finally, time and money must be budgeted to enable field
commanders to bring their equipment up to the specified
standards prior to the hand-off date.
It appears to this author that the most effective method
of redistributing old radios is a centrally managed
approach. All radios which must be transferred between
MACOMs would be brought to a depot maintenance facility.
Radios could be screened efficiently for overhaul, and
repair parts could be ordered efficiently. A uniform
quality control standard could be possible and detailed
accurate status reports could be obtained rapidly.
C. INSTALLATION KITS
The challenges regarding redistribution of installation
kits closely parallel the issues concerning the
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redistribution of radios. Only a centralized plan can be
effectively and consistently implemented. The detailed plan
for the redistribution of radios should also specify how
many of each type of installation kit are required at each
specific destination. Installation kits which pass through
a depot maintenance facility can be inspected, and fully
overhauled, if necessary. A forecast of potential installa-
tion kit rebuilds could be made along with an estimate of
how many specific piece parts will be required. This will
allow the procurement system to anticipate long lead time
items and to take advantage of economic order quantities.
D. IMBEDDED COMSEC
The modification which will imbed COMSEC into the frame
of the radio is presently under development. It is crucial
that the engineering process take into consideration the
potential problem areas identified in Chapter V. The major
hurdle for the imbedded version of SINCGARS is the distinc-
tion which exists between the COMSEC maintenance system of
NSA and the conventional electronic repair facilities of the
Army. Unless the modified version is designed to fit into
the two current systems, there will have to be some effort
made to marry the two systems. One method of integrating
the two systems is to assign COMSEC repairmen (31S) into the
conventional DS maintenance facilities. This way, a
COMSEC-modif ied radio would not have to be physically trans-
ferred between maintenance facilities depending upon whether
it has a COMSEC problem or a conventional repair problem.
Further integration could be achieved by physically
combining the two shops. This solution has some significant
drawbacks. First, it would involve a great deal of coordi-
nation with NSA. There is some doubt whether they would be
willing to relinquish authority over any COMSEC activities.
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The second problem involves the nature of the two facili-
ties. The SINCGARS radio is not the only COMSEC equipment
which must be repaired by the COMSEC maintenance personnel.
It does not make good sense to combine COMSEC maintenance
facilities with conventional electronics maintenance
facilities because of a single type of equipment.
Another approach to the COMSEC modification would be to
design the COMSEC module to be easily removed from the frame
of the radio. This approach would favor a COMSEC module
which functions in the same manner as the current COMSEC
equipment. The module would simply be located inside the
radio. In this situation, an inoperative radio system might
be diagnosed to the point where it is determined that either
the radio is defective or the COMSEC module is defective.
If the COMSEC module is defective, it can be removed and
sent to the COMSEC repair facility. This way, the two main-
tenance facilities could maintain their integrity and
adequate security could be preserved.
The COMSEC modification will obviously require at least
some changes to the operation and maintenance procedures for
the SINCGARS radio. If possible, the Test Program Sets for
a radio with imbedded COMSEC should be identical to the TPS
for a radio without the modification. Differences in parts
and operation should be kept to a bare minimum.
If there are differences between the two versions, the
impact of these differences can be minimized through a thor-
ough distribution plan. The fielding schedule is known in
advance and the production schedule is known in advance.
The production lots should be matched with gaining commands
in a way which precludes a gaining unit from receiving two
"flavors" of radio. If a MACOM has to receive both flavors
of radio, at least the distribution to the subordinate units
should be consistent.
E. WARRANTIES
It is almost certain that both the airborne version of
SINCGARS and the second source ground version will have
warranties while the current ground radio does not carry a
warranty [Ref. 24]. It will be necessary to either plan for
this situation to minimize the difficulties or to procure a
warranty for all of the radios. In order to minimize diffi-
culties, there will need to be some means of clearly identi-
fying a radio with a warranty from one without . Some type
of seal on the radio case is a suitable method [Ref. 36].
Even with a means of identifying radios, it will be
difficult to manage the two types of radios separately.
Maintenance plans will have to delineate procedures for
evacuating radios having a warranty and for repairing a
radio without a warranty. The contractor will be heavily
involved in the maintenance of the first 40,000 radios.
Therefore, a better solution to the warranty problem would
be to obtain an express warranty for radios produced under
the initial production contract. The increase in compensa-
tion which the contractor is likely to demand will be offset
to some degree by the avoidance of confusion and complexity
in the maintenance management area. A tradeoff of this
type is consistent with the policy and guidance in Chapter
II.
F. DIRECT SUPPORT TEST EQUIPMENT
The possibility of procuring unnecessary direct support
test equipment because of the fielding of the Intermediate
Forward Test Facility represents a relatively small dollar
figure. In order to prevent such a situation, there must be
some coordination between the SINCGARS staff and the Test
Equipment Modernization (TEMOD) staff. The decision to
procure the additional digital voltmeters and oscilloscopes
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can be delayed up until the required lead time to buy the
equipment. By that time, the fielding schedule for IFTE
will hopefully be solidified.
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VII. SUMMARY , CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . SUMMARY
1. What are the maj or potential problem areas in the
system support area of the Materiel Fielding Plan for
the SINCGARS ground radio system
,
and how might these
problems be addressed ?
The major problem areas, as addressed above in the
conclusions and recommendations, are the redistribu-
tion plan for old radios and installation kits, the
imbedded COMSEC modification, and the lack of
warranty on the current production contract. The
magnitude of the problem regarding procurement of
unnecessary D.S. test equipment is relatively small
in relationship to the entire SINCGARS project.
2. What are the principal characteristics of the
Materiel Fielding Plan for the SINCGARS ground radio
system ?
The ground radio MFP calls for "handoff" of 100%
operational radio systems which will be installed by
the MFT into the user vehicles. The SINCGARS radios
will displace the VRC-12 and PRC-77 radios on a
"one- for-one" basis and all of the radios will be
redistributed to other units or countries.
3. What is the maintenance concept for SINCGARS
,
and how
can it be implemented ?
The SINCGARS radio is designed to be repaired within
the Army's standard three- level maintenance system.
The radio has a modular design and built in test
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equipment to facilitate isolation to line- replaceable
units. The AN/MSM-105 Automated Test/Repair Facility
will be utilized at GS and Depot Maintenance for test
and repair of SINCGARS shop-replaceable-units (SRUs).
The initial fielding will be supported by contractor
maintenance and supply at GS and Depot maintenance
levels
.
4. What are the warranty /guaranty features and how will
these be enforced ?
The initial ground version production contract does
not include a warranty. The second source ground
version, as well as the airborne version will be
required to have a warranty provision. There is no
detailed planning concerning the enforcement of the
warranties because they have yet to be contracted
for. However, this research shows that having a
warranty for equipment in a combat unit presents
administration problems in terms of field repair. If
there are identical radios, some with warranties, and




What are the key aspects of supply support for
SINCGARS
,
and what are the implications in terms of
spare parts acquisition ?
The spare parts for SINCGARS will ultimately be
procured as a result of a demand-driven supply
system. However, the initial provisioning will be
effected with the assistance of the Selected
Essential-Item Stockage for Availability Method
(SESAME) model. Since supply support will be
augmented by contractor support for the initial
fielding, spare parts procurement will not be made on
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What resource requirements have yet to be identified ?
The funding for the repair of the old radios will
require additional resources which have not yet been
budgeted. In addition to the repair of old radios,
the repair/replacement of old installation kits will
require further funding.
7 How might the problems identified in the maintenance
and supply support planning be addressed and
resolved ?
Each of the problem areas identified, are being
addressed to some degree already. The redistribution
of old radios appears to require the most additional
attention. If CECOM were to develop an accurate
estimate of the true condition of old radios and
installation kits, they could budget funds and then
order parts in an efficient manner. Responsibility
for the drafting of a Materiel Transfer Plan should
be identified and a centrally controlled transfer
plan should be implemented.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The SINCGARS project is one of the largest in the Army
and the success of the program is crucial to the Army's
combat effectiveness. The Project Manager staff is a highly
capable organization which is well aware of the issues iden-
tified in this study. The Materiel Fielding effort has been
several years in development and reflects the lessons
learned in earlier programs. Notwithstanding the accelera-
tion of production in 1977, the SINCGARS project has been
underway nearly ten years.
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The quality of the MFP is obvious and it reflects the
lengthy maturation period the program has enjoyed. While
this study has identified some potential problem areas
regarding the MFP, none of these appear to be unmanageable
or undetected by the program office.
The following conclusions are supported by this research
effort
:
1. Without significant development of the planning for
redistribution of the VRC- 12 series and PRC- 77 radios
there may be problems in this area . As discussed in
Chapter V, Section D, this conclusion is based on the
assumption that a need exists for each old radio, and
the assumption that a significant quantity of old
radios will require additional resources in order to
effect a smooth transition. Combat units will not
accept equipment that is of poor quality and, without
a centralized redistribution plan, some units may
attempt to transfer some of their old radios in less
than 10/20 standards. Effective transfer of the old
radios will affect the fielding of SINCGARS, so the
significance of the redistribution effort should not
be ignored.
2. The potential for problems in redistributing the
radios will be matched by similar problems redistri -
buting installation kits unless the planning in this
area is improved . An installation kit is as impor-
tant to the operational deployment of a radio system
as the radiotelephone itself. Based on the limited
data available, it appears that the condition of a
majority of the installation kits is generally less
than the 10/20 standards (Chapter V, Section D)
.
Redistribution without a rebuild program may be
infeasible. Installation kit components which
require long lead times to procure may impede the
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The fact that the airborne version and the second
source ground version will be warranted while the
present ground version is not may cause problems
within the Army maintenance system . There may be
confusion over which radio has a warranty and which
one doesn't. It will be difficult to manage the two
different types because the radios which are
warranted will presumably carry restrictions on the
exercise of the warranty. Maintenance personnel who
have worked on unwarranted SINCGARS radios and come
across a warranted version may inadvertently "fix" a
radio that they should not. Maintenance managers
will have to devise procedures to prevent this type
of situation. More importantly, they will have to
devise a dual set of maintenance procedures for the




The imbedded COMSEC modification may cause signifi -
cant problems in terms of the SINCGARS maintenance
concept . The greatest potential problem area centers
around the maintenance procedures and equipment. The
COMSEC maintenance and direct support electronic
maintenance shops are presently wholly independent of
each other. It is not clear what procedures will be
used for repairing a radio which has COMSEC imbedded.
If the version with COMSEC differs greatly from the
version without, there may be a need for a parallel
set of test program sets, parallel maintenance
manuals, and parallel spare part flows'. As with the
warranty issue this will place an added burden on the
maintenance manager.
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5. If the Intermediate Forward Test Equipment ( IFTE ) is
fielded to the United States Army Europe (USAREUR )
prior to CY 1990 , there will be no need to procure
$90
,
000 worth of direct support test equipment . The
Materiel Fielding Plan calls for the procurement of
two items of SINCGARS-peculiar test equipment. IFTE
will supercede the need for both items of equipment,
and IFTE is scheduled to be fielded in March 1989
(Chapter V, Section E). However, if IFTE is not
fielded prior to 1990, the equipment will have to be
procured since it is necessary to perform the DS
maintenance function.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are a result of this
research effort
:
1. Develop a detailed plan for the centrally controlled
redistribution of VRC- 12 series and PRC-77 radios .
Effective transfer will require additional funds
which have yet to be budgeted. An estimate of repair
costs should be made and a plan should be drafted for
a centrally controlled redistribution process. The
plan should direct that all radios redistributed from
one MACOM to another be directed to a depot. The
depot should screen candidates for complete overhaul
versus minor repairs and repair parts should be
ordered centrally.
2. Redistribution of old installation kits should be
centrally managed in a manner similar to the radios .
The current condition of installation kits is similar
to that of the radios. In order to effect a smooth
transfer, there will have to be both a reconditioning
of major components of installation kits and




Consideration should be given to the procurement of a
warranty for the present ground version of SINCGARS .
It would be difficult to calculate a dollar figure
for the savings to be enjoyed by this course of
action. However, such a move would clearly eliminate
the possibility for confusion in field units. Since
ITT will be deeply involved in the maintenance
process for the first two years, it could be argued
that the Government has already purchased a warranty
of sorts
.
The engineering process for the ij bedded COMSEC modi -
fication should be tightly controlled . The engineers
should be constrained in the design of the imbedded
COMSEC version of SINCGARS so that the new version
does not require a whole different maintenance
process. The change should be as "transparent" as
possible for the user in terms of maintenance and
operations. Ideally, the imbedded version of
SINCGARS will require no changes to the maintenance
process
.
The fielding schedule for the Intermediate Forward
Test Equipment ( IFTE ) should be finalized as soon as
possible . If IFTE will be available in USAREUR prior
to 1990, the MFP directive to procure DS level TMDE
should be modified. The oscilloscope, AN/USM-488,
and the digital voltmeter, AN/USM-486, should not be
bought for USAREUR and FORSCOM if they will never use
the equipment. According to the current schedule for
IFTE fielding, it appears that IFTE will, in fact,
arrive in USAREUR and FORSCOM units ahead of
SINCGARS.
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D. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR RESEARCH
This study has been restricted to the maintenance and
supply support aspects of the SINCGARS Materiel Fielding
Plan. However, during the course of the study two areas
which might benefit from additional research were
identified.
Many of the more significant problems encountered by the
SINCGARS program have been caused, to some degree, by the
acceleration of the program in 1977. During the ensuing
concurrency the Program office had to play "catch up" in
several areas in order to prepare for the transition to
production. When the decision to accelerate the program was
made, it was not known in any detail what the hidden costs
of the acceleration might be. A cost/benefit analysis of
the concurrency experiences of SINCGARS would be extremely
helpful to other decision makers considering concurrency for
other systems
.
Similarly, the decision to imbed COMSEC has had, and
will continue to have, many hidden costs. While there is a
notion that a major change to a project will have spillover
costs, an analysis of those costs in a specific case could
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